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Court will opt for an outright application of the grouping of contacts
test to the borrowing statute. It is to be hoped that the Court's
resolution of this conflict will be free of both the mechanical ap-
proach of Myers and the ambiguous reasoning of Martin.
CPLR 214(5): Three-year statute of limitations applied to action
for abuse of process.
Article 2 of the CPLR contains detailed provisioins indicating
the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action
in New York. None of these provisions, however, expressly declares
which statute of limitations governs an action for abuse of process.3 2
CPLR 215(3) provides a one-year limitation period for actions based
on the intentional torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, ma-
licious prosecution, defamation, or invasion of privacy.33 Section
214(5) applies a three-year statute of limitations to any "action to
recover damages for a personal injury except as provided in section
215."13 Finally, CPLR 213(1) requires that actions "for which no
limitation is specifically prescribed by law" be brought within six
years from the accrual of the cause of action.35 Recently, in Levine
v. Sherman, 36 the Supreme Court, Nassau County, in a case of first
impression, held that although abuse of process is an intentional
tort which would logically fit most neatly among those actions listed
in 215(3), the language of the CPLR mandates application of the
three-year statute of limitations provided in CPLR 214(5)2
" Abuse of process is "the misuse or perversion of regularly issued legal process for a
purpose not justified by the nature of the process." Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom
Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 400, 343 N.E.2d 278, 280, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 639 (1975);
accord, Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 373, 7 N.E.2d 268, 269 (1937); Dean v. Kochendorfer,
237 N.Y. 384, 390, 143 N.E. 229, 231 (1924); Carver Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Williams, 47
App. Div. 2d 834, 835, 365 N.Y.S.2d 563, 566 (2d Dep't 1975). For a discussion of the elements
of an action for abuse of process, see note 50 infra.
- CPLR 215(3) states that a one-year limitation period will be applied to
an action to recover damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing special damages, or a violation of
the right of privacy under section fifty-one of the civil rights law . ...
31 CPLR 214(5).
35 CPLR 213(1). The "usual application [of CPLR 213(1)] is to actions in which equita-
ble relief is sought." 1 WK&M 213.01 (footnote omitted); see Ford v. Clendenin, 215 N.Y.
10, 16, 109 N.E. 124, 126 (1915) (applies to any and every form of equitable action); Beresovski
v. Warszawski, 28 N.Y.2d 419, 423-25 & n.2, 271 N.E.2d 520, 522-23 & n.2, 322 N.Y.S.2d 673,
675-76 & n.2 (1971) (applies to equitable remedy of specific performance).
" 86 Misc. 2d 997, 384 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
17 Id. at 999, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 687. Coincidentally, 10 days after this statute of limitations
issue was decided by the Levine court as one of first impression, the Supreme Court, New
York County, was presented with the same issue in Brecker v. Groosman, 175 N.Y.L.J. 123,
June 25, 1976, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 24, 1976). The Brecker court, after
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The Levine plaintiff instituted an action for abuse of process
almost two and one-half years after the cause of action had ac-
crued.3s Claiming that plaintiffs cause of action was time barred
under the one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts, defen-
dant moved to dismiss the complaint. The court rejected defen-
dant's contention, but implicitly conceded that it was not without
merit. Justice Harnett acknowledged that CPLR 215(3) lists most
intentional torts, including malicious prosecution, 39 a tort very simi-
lar to abuse of process in that both involve an "improper purpose
in the use of legal process."40 The court pointed out, however, that
the listing of causes of action subject to the one-year limitation
period of CPLR 215(3) is exclusive, and abuse of process is "conspic-
uously absent" from the enumeration of intentional torts therein.4'
Noting that despite the similarity between malicious prosecution
and abuse of process they are nevertheless "separately classifiable
torts with different composing elements, 4 2 the court declared that
even if the omission of abuse of process from CPLR 215(3) was a
legislative oversight, "[n]othing gives the court power to add to
this list. Only the Legislature can do that."43
Having thus rejected the one-year statute of limitations pro-
vided by CPLR 215(3), the court held that abuse of process is a
"personal injury" within the meaning of CPLR 214(5), which pre-
first noting that there is no statute of limitations dealing specifically with abuse of process,
held that the applicable limitation period is either three years as provided in CPLR 214(4)
or CPLR 214(5), or six years pursuant to CPLR 213(1). Id., col. 5. The Brecker court, how-
ever, did not determine which limitation period is applicable since neither would bar the
claim. It held only that an action for abuse of process instituted more than one year after
the cause of action has accrued is not time barred by the 1-year limitation period of CPLR
215. Id.
3- Plaintiff's action was predicated upon the fact that three actions had been instituted
against him to collect the same $690.20 debt. All three actions were dismissed, final appeal
therefrom terminating almost two and one-half years before plaintiff commenced the instant
action. The court found that the cause of action accrued on the date the final appeal had
been dismissed. 86 Misc. 2d at 998, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
31 Id. A malicious prosecution is "one that is begun in malice, without probable cause to
believe it can succeed, and which finally ends in failure." Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 5, 73
N.E. 495, 496 (1905); accord, Best v. Genung's Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 550, 552, 363 N.Y.S.2d
669, 670 (3d Dep't 1975); Watson v. City of New York, 57 Misc. 2d 542, 545, 293 N.Y.S.2d
348, 353 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).
11 Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 400, 343
N.E.2d 278, 281, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 639 (1975). The Farmingdale Court pointed out that both
abuse of process and malicious prosecution "possess the common element of improper pur-
pose in the use of legal process and both were spawned from the action for trespass on the
case in the nature of conspiracy." Id.
1, 86 Misc. 2d at 999, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
'2 Id.
43 Id.
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scribes a three-year limitation period for all personal injury actions
not governed by CPLR 215. Justice Harnett felt that this result was
mandated by section 37-a of the General Construction Law, which
defines "personal injury" as including defamation, malicious prose-
cution, assault, battery, false imprisonment, "or other actionable
injury to the person."44 Unlike the list of intentional torts in CPLR
215(3), the enumeration of actions within the definition of a per-
sonal injury was found to be nonexclusive. Accordingly, the court
held that abuse of process fits squarely within the statutory frame-
work of CPLR 214(5) rather than the catch-all provision of section
213(1).
It is submitted that the court properly held the language of
CPLR 215(3) to create a "closed set,"45 not amenable to judicial
expansion. This holding clearly follows the general rule of statutory
construction that the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of
the other. 6 Thus, the specific listing of torts in CPLR 215(3) neces-
sarily implies the exclusion of all others, and, therefore, CPLR
215(3) should not be deemed to incorporate the unlisted tort of
abuse of process.
There is also substantial support for the court's finding that
abuse of process is a "personal injury" within the ambit of CPLR
214(5). It has been repeatedly held that the term personal injury is
to be interpreted broadly and is not limited to physical contact. 7
Indeed, the term has been found to include "every variety of injury
to a person's body, feelings or reputation."4 Since abuse of process
usually involves coercion, 9 it is clear that some degree of personal
" N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 37-a (McKinney 1951) (emphasis added). In so holding, the
Levine court rejected the contention that the controlling statute of limitations is CPLR
213(1). That section mandates that actions "for which no limitation is specifically prescribed
by law" must be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues. In practice,
CPLR 213(1) is primarily utilized when the cause of action sounds in equity. See note 35
supra.
86 Misc. 2d at 999, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
4, See, e.g., Collins v. National Aniline Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d
900, 186 N.Y.S.2d 979 (3d Dep't 1959) (mem.) (list of injurious chemicals in Workmen's
Compensation Law implies exclusion of injurious chemicals not listed); Uline v. MVAIC, 28
Misc. 2d 1002, 1004, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1961).
, E.g., Riddle v. MacFadden, 201 N.Y. 215, 94 N.E. 644 (1911) (unauthorized use of
one's name or portrait is a personal injury); cf. Rolnick v. Rolnick, 55 Misc. 2d 243, 284
N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967), rev'd mem. on other grounds, 29 App. Div. 2d
987, 290 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd mem., 24 N.Y.2d 805, 248 N.E.2d 442, 300
N.Y.S.2d 586 (1969).
13 Bonilla v. Reeves, 49 Misc. 2d 273, 279, 267 N.Y.S.2d 374, 381 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1966) (interference with right to sepulcher is personal injury).
1 See Pagliarulo v. Pagliarulo, 30 App. Div. 2d 840, 293 N.Y.S.2d 13 (2d Dep't 1968)
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injury is involved.
Despite the court's thorough reasoning and apparent accuracy,
the Levine decision has at least one unfortunate aspect. The court's
holding may be viewed as logically inconsistent with the statutory
scheme of limitation periods inasmuch as it applies a three-year
statute of limitations to abuse of process, whereas malicious prose-
cution, an intentional tort closely analogous to abuse of process, is
governed by a one-year statute of limitations. Although the two
actions are distinguishable in that their respective elements are not
identical,50 it is difficult to justify the application of different stat-
utes of limitations. The major reason for the comparatively short
one-year limitations period applied to malicious prosecution is that
its perpetration is "known promptly to the person injured."" Since
the abuse of process tort usually involves coercion, 2 its perpetration
will similarly be readily apparent.
(mem.) (cause of action for abuse of process lies where it is alleged that process was used to
compel plaintiff, by means of fear, to meet defendant's demands); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 121, at 857 (4th ed. 1971).
"0 An action for malicious prosecution is based on the unlawful commencement of a cause
of action, see note 39 supra, and consists of three basic elements. First, there must be malice
on the part of the party who brought the action. Vennard v. Sunnyside Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
44 App. Div. 2d 727, 354 N.Y.S.2d 446 (2d Dep't 1974) (mer.). The element of malice
required in an action for malicious prosecution may be inferred from a showing that the
defendant acted with "wanton, reckless or grossly negligent disregard of the plaintiffs rights,
inconsistent with good faith." Biener v. City of New York, 47 App. Div. 2d 520, 521, 362
N.Y.S.2d 563, 567 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.) (citations omitted); accord, Watson v. City of New
York, 57 Misc. 2d 542, 548, 293 N.Y.S.2d 348, 356 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).
Second, there must be a lack of reasonable cause to believe that the action could succeed.
Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 5-6, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (1905); Best v. Genung's Inc., 46 App. Div.
2d 550, 552, 363 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (3d Dep't 1975). Lastly, the action must terminate in
favor of the defendant. Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 5, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (1905).
An action for abuse of process, on the other hand, is based on misuse of process which
has been legally issued, see note 32 supra, and requires a showing that the process was in
fact used for a purpose outside of the one for which it was issued, Dean v. Kochendorfer, 237
N.Y. 384, 390, 143 N.E. 229, 231 (1924). The elements of an action for abuse of process are:
(1) regularly issued process; (2) harmful intent on the part of the person who caused the
process to be issued; (3) use of the process to achieve "some collateral advantage or correspon-
ding detriment to the plaintiff which is outside the legitimate ends of the process." Board of
Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 403, 343 N.E.2d 278, 283,
380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 642 (1975). It should be noted that the mere existence of a malicious motive
for the use of process does not constitute abuse of process; the process must be used for other
than that for which it was intended. Bohm v. Holzberg, 47 App. Div. 2d 764, 365 N.Y.S.2d
262 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
The main distinction between the two causes of action is that an action for abuse of
process arises from the improper use of process after it has been issued, whereas an action
for malicious prosecution lies as a result of the defendant causing process to unlawfully issue.
Assets Collecting Co. v. Myers, 167 App. Div. 133, 138, 152 N.Y.S. 930, 933 (1st Dep't 1915).
" SECOND REP. at 73.
51 See note 49 supra.
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This criticism, however, is more properly addressed to the legis-
lature than the courts. It is submitted that CPLR 215(3) should be
amended to include abuse of process among the intentional torts
subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Until such an amend-
ment is forthcoming, however, the Levine court's application of a
three-year period is the proper result.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF
COURT
CPLR 303: Counterclaim by Seider-predicated third-party Dole
defendant does not constitute commencement of an action.
CPLR 303 provides that the commencement of an action in
New York by a person not otherwise amenable to personal jurisdic-
tion exposes the plaintiff to full in personam jurisdiction in any
action brought by a party to the original action which "would have
been permitted as a counterclaim had the action been brought in
the supreme court." 3 Thus, a nonresident who commences an ac-
tion in New York assumes the risk that a party to the action may
assert a claim against him, for which, pursuant to CPLR 303, he is
subject to full in personam jurisdiction. 4 Recently, in Green v.
Bender,5 5 the Supreme Court, Westchester County, was confronted
with the novel question whether a Seider-predicated " third-party
53 CPLR 303.
" See 1 WK&M 303.01.
55 175 N.Y.L.J. 115, June 15, 1976, at 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County).
" In Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), the Court
of Appeals held that a nondomiciliary may be brought within the jurisdiction of the New York
courts by attachment of his automobile liability insurance policy if his insurer is present in
this state. The Court reasoned that because the insurer had an obligation to the insured to
defend and indemnify him to the extent of the insurance policy limits, a "debt" existed which
was subject to attachment. The Seider decision was reconsidered and reaffirmed in Simpson
v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), wherein the Court
declared that a Seider-predicated defendant is entitled to make a limited appearance
whereby his liability cannot exceed the limits of his insurance policy. Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d
at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37. See also Bertucci v. Red Top Sedan Serv., Inc., 48 App. Div.
2d 677, 368 N.Y.S.2d 236 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.); Seligman v. Tucker, 46 App. Div. 2d 402,
362 N.Y.S.2d 881 (4th Dep't), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 921, 335
N.E.2d 844, 373 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1975) (mem.); Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298
N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't) (mem.), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 24 N.Y.2d 740, 250
N.E.2d 68, 302 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1969). The right to a limited appearance has been codified in
CPLR 320(c)(1), which provides for a limited appearance where quasi-in-rem jurisdiction has
been obtained over a defendant by virtue of attachment of his property within the state. As
supplemented by Simpson, Seider has withstood constitutional attack in the federal courts.
See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). For an analysis of the constitutional issues presented
in Seider, see Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58 (1968).
